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Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.: Recognizing a Public
Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has adhered steadfastly to the at-will
employment doctrine when resolving disputes between employers and employ-
ees.' Recently, in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.2 the North Carolina
Supreme Court recognized a newly broadened public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine and created a cause of action for wrongful discharge
based on this new theory.3 The court, by expanding this exception to the at-will
employment doctrine, followed the trend of other jurisdictions and afforded em-
ployees relief for discharge by employers whose conduct violates the state's pub-
lic policy. 4
This Note will analyze the changes in the at-will employment doctrine in
North Carolina. The Note will discuss Sides v. Duke University,5 which created
a limited public policy exception. The Note will then examine Coman, which by
expanding the public policy exception and creating a bad faith exception, signifi-
cantly changed employment law in North Carolina. This Note concludes that
the Supreme Court of North Carolina has created an overly broad public policy
exception and bad faith exception that will encourage numerous plaintiff-em-
ployee lawsuits and increase the cost of doing business for employers.
Mark Coman was first employed by Thomas Manufacturing as a long dis-
tance truck driver in 1978.6 In 1984 plaintiff Coman was hired as a full-time
employee and hauled goods in defendant's trucks to locations within the United
States and Canada.7 Defendant's operations were governed by the United States
Department of Transportation regulations.8 According to these regulations, a
truck driver must rest eight hours for every ten hours of driving time.9 In addi-
tion, the driver must maintain accurate logs of his driving time. 10 North Caro-
lina regulations impose identical requirements.1' Defendant employer infoned
plaintiff, however, that he would be required to drive for periods in excess of
1. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254,
182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
2. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
3. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
4. The dissent in Coman pointed out that California, the jurisdiction that led the creation of
the tort of wrongful discharge in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), has since retreated from its broad treatment of the tort, restricting its
applicability in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988). Coman, 325 N.C. at 185-86, 381 S.E.2d at 453 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
5. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
6. Coman, 325 N.C. at 173, 381 S.E.2d at 445.
7. Id
8. Id. at 173, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
9. Id.; 49 C.F.R. § 395.7 (1988).
10. 49 C.F.R. § 395.8 (1988).
11. The North Carolina General Assembly authorized the Division of Motor Vehicles to pro-
mulgate safety regulations for motor carriers in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-384 (1988).
The Division of Motor Vehicles adopted the rules and regulations promulgated by the federal De-
partment of Transportation. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19A, r. 3D.0801 (Feb. 1988).
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those allowed by federal and state regulations and would also be required to
falsify his log so defendant would not be penalized for violating the regula-
tions. 12 Plaintiff refused to falsify his records or drive in excess of the time al-
lowed by the regulations. 13 Defendant then threatened to reduce plaintiff's
salary by fifty percent, 14 "such reduction being tantamount to a discharge of
plaintiff." 15
Plaintiff filed suit, basing his wrongful discharge claim on a public policy
theory. 16 The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it failed to state
a claim for relief.17 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision, 18 holding that the facts of the case did not fall within the public
policy exception created by Sides v. Duke University.19 The appellate court fur-
ther held that the remedy allowed under federal law provided plaintiff adequate
relief.20
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, finding that the facts of
Coman fell within the Sides public policy exception. 2 1 Moreover, the court
broadeped the public policy exception beyond that originally conceived by the
court of appeals in Sides.22 The supreme court pointed out that the safety of
travel on the highways of the state is of paramount concern to the state govern-
ment and that, as a result, the state legislature has regulated travel on the state's
highways extensively.23 According to the court, the employer's act of firing
plaintiff for refusing to violate the federal and state regulations violated the
state's public policy of promoting highway safety. 24 The court noted that
Coman confronted the dilemma of losing his job or risking imprisonment for
violating the regulations.25 Because the state has a strong interest in encouraging
"employees to refrain from violating [the state's] public policy at the demand of
12. Coman, 325 N.C. at 173, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
13. Id. at 173-74, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
14. Id. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
15. Id. Because the court limited its holding to recognition of the wrongful discharge cause of
action, it was not necessary to determine whether plaintiff's salary was actually reduced.
16. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
17. Id. at 173, 381 S.E.2d at 445.
18. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 91 N.C. App. 327, 334-35, 371 S.E.2d 731, 736 (1988), rev'd,
325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
19. Id. at 332-33, 371 S.E.2d at 734-35 (citing Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328
S.E.2d 818, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985)). For a discussion of the public
policy exception created by Sides, see infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
20. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 91 N.C. App. 327, 334-35, 371 S.E.2d 731, 736 (1988), rev'd,
325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989). The supreme court in Coman referred to the "constitutional
issue of preemption by the federal government under the supremacy clause," but did not address the
issue because it was not raised in a lower court. Coman, 325 N.C. at 174 n.1, 381 S.E.2d at 446 n.1.
Federal law prohibits discharge for refusing to violate these regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 2305(a)-(b)
(1982). Plaintiff must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 180 days after the alleged
violation. 49 U.S.C. § 2305(c)(1) (1982). Plaintiff's remedy may include an order for employer to
abate the unlawful practice, reinstatement of plaintiff to his former position, back pay, compensatory
damages, and attorney's fees if plaintiff so requests. 49 U.S.C. § 2305(c)(2)(B) (1982).
21. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
22. Id. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
23. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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their employers,"'2 6 the court recognized plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful
discharge based on the public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine.2 7
The supreme court cited two cases in support of its recognition of the public
policy exception. First, the court reasoned from a nineteenth century case, Has-
kins v. Royster,28 that state law had never approved an employee's dismissal in
bad faith.29 The court then cited Malever v. Jewelry Co. 30 for the proposition
that a permanent job is an "indefinite general hiring terminable in good faith at
the will of either party."'31
The court also supported its decision by citing cases from other jurisdic-
tions that have recognized the public policy exception. 32 The court asserted that
it was justified in making this marked change in North Carolina employment
law because approximately four-fifths of United States jurisdictions have recog-
nized this exception.33 In particular, the court analogized Coman to McClana-
han v. Remington Freight Lines,34 an Indiana case "on all fours with the present
appeal."'35 In McClanahan plaintiff truck driver refused to drive an overweight
truck through Illinois.36 Defendant's manager ordered plaintiff to return the
truck to defendant's headquarters. 37 In retaliation for not following defendant's
order to drive the overweight truck in violation of Illinois state law, defendant
fired plaintiff.38 The Indiana court held that allowing the discharge would con-
travene the state's public policy 39 and stated that a "tightly defined exception to
26. Id.
27. Id. The court stated:
Where the public policy providing for the safety of the traveling public is involved, we find
it is in the best interest of the state on behalf of its citizens to encourage employees to
refrain from violating that public policy at the demand of their employers. Providing em-
ployees with a remedy should they be discharged for refusing to violate this public policy
supplies that encouragement.
Id., 381 S.E.2d at 447-48.
28. 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
29. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176-77, 381 S.E.2d at 448. The court stated that Haskins stood for the
proposition that the "master could not discharge his servant in bad faith." Id. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at
448.
30. 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943).
31. Coman, 325 N.C. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448 (emphasis added). The dissenting justice in
Coman viewed the majority's reliance on Haskins and Malever as misleading. Id. at 179, 381 S.E.2d
at 449 (Meyer, ., dissenting). According to the dissenting justice, Haskins dealt with the malicious
enticement of agricultural workers, not wrongful discharge. Id. at 179-80, 381 S.E.2d at 449 (Meyer,
J., dissenting). Furthermore, Malever contained no discussion of good faith. Id. at 180, 381 S.E.2d
at 450 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
33. J. Parker, The Uses of the Past: The Surprising History of Terminable-At- Will Employment
in North Carolina, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 170 & n.13 (1987).
34. 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988).
35. Coman, 325 N.C. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
36. McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 391.
37. Id.
38. Id
39. Id. at 393. The statute in question in McClanahan is an Illinois statute, even though both
plaintiff and the defendant were domiciled in Indiana. Plaintiff was scheduled to drive through
Illinois and was required to obey its regulations. The court based its exception to the at-will employ-
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the employment at will doctrine is appropriate."' 4 Highlighting the employee's
dilemma,41 the Indiana court recognized a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge under these facts.42
The North Carolina court further justified its decision by pointing out that
scholars support the recognition of the public policy exception.43 The court also
emphasized that its decision was not based on a violation of federal public
policy. 44
The decision in Coman marks a departure from North Carolina's tradition-
ally strict adherence to the at-will employment doctrine.45 This doctrine was
developed in the late nineteenth century.4 6 Horace Wood first stated the Ameri-
can version of the at-will employment doctrine during the Industrial Revolu-
tion. 47 The premise of the doctrine was that the employee-employer relationship
was terminable at will by either party in the absence of an employment contract
fixing a length of employment48 or when an existing contract did not fix the
length of employment.49 Courts in the United States adopted Wood's definition
readily and this legal concept aided in the rapid economic development of the
United States in the nineteenth century.50
The courts in North Carolina strictly followed this rule for nearly ninety
ment doctrine on the violation of any statute or regulation, not only those statutes passed by the
Indiana legislature. Id.
40. 1a4
41. IeL The court stated that under the Illinois statute, the employee would be personally liable
for the violation. Id.
42. Id.
43. Coman, 325 N.C. at 178, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
44. Id. at 178, 381 S.E.2d at 449. The dissenting justice argued that the plaintiff's remedy was
available in the federal courts, not the state courts, because a federal statute provides a remedy. Id.
at 179, 381 S.E.2d at 449 (Meyer, J., dissenting). See supra note 20 (describing the applicable federal
remedy).
45. See, eg., Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987); Presnell v. Pell,
298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976);
Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
46. A. HILL, "WRoNGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOY-
MENT DOCTRINE 4 (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton
School (1987)).
47. Wood stated the American doctrine of employment-at-will:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
Id. at 5 (quoting H.G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272-73 (2d ed. 1886)).
. A commentator has pointed out that none of the four cases Wood cited in support of the rule
stands for the proposition. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
341-42 n.54 (1974).
48. A. HILL, supra note 46, at 5.
49. Id.
50. Coman, 325 N.C. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at 446. The American rule of the at-will employment
doctrine is frequently stated thus: "All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few,for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.
Afortiori they may 'threaten' to discharge them without thereby doing an illegal act, per se." Payne
v. Western & Ad. RR., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hutton v.
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years.51 The state legislature modified the at-will doctrine only in a very limited
way, by prohibiting specific retaliatory discharges by employers.52 Until Coman,
the North Carolina Supreme Court consistently refused to recognize the tort of
wrongful discharge unless and until the legislature expressly created the cause of
action by statute.53
In Dockery v. Lampart Table Co. 54 plaintiff was injured at his place of em-
ployment when some tables fell on him.5" Plaintiff suffered a partial permanent
disability and filed a workers' compensation claim.5 6 He was later fired by the
defendant, allegedly in retaliation for filing the claim.57 Dockery was a case of
first impression in North Carolina. 58 At that time, there was not a provision in
the North Carolina workers' compensation statute creating a cause of action in
tort for the retaliatory firing of an employee who had filed a workers' compensa-
tion claim. 59 Plaintiff cited cases from other jurisdictions that recognized this
tort; the workers' compensation statutes in those jurisdictions, however, specifi-
cally provided for the cause of action.60 The Dockery court refused to recognize
the cause of action for retaliatory discharge,61 reasoning that if the legislature
had intended to limit the at-will employment doctrine, it would have created the
cause of action within this otherwise comprehensive legislation. 62 The court re-
ferred to the long tradition of the at-will employment doctrine in North Carolina
Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915) (emphasis added); see also Wagonseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 376, 710 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1985).
The North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that the at-will employment doctrine aided
economic growth in the United States. Coman, 325 N.C. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at 446.
51. The Supreme Court of North Carolina first expounded the at-will-employment rule in Ed-
wards v. Seaboard & Roanoke R.R., 121 N.C. 490, 491, 28 S.E.2d 137, 137 (1897). The North
Carolina Court of Appeals created the first significant judicial exception to the rule in Sides v. Duke
Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
52. An employer cannot terminate an employee for filing for workers' compensation, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985), involvement in labor dispute, id. § 95-83 (1985), filing OSHA claim, Id.
§ 95-130(8) (1985), filing wage and hour complaint, id. § 95-25(20) (1985), or testifying at an unem-
ployment compensation hearing, id. § 96-15.1 (1985). In Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C. App.
35, 40-41, 370 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1988), the court of appeals interpreted § 96-15.1 in the employment
at-will context.
53. Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988); Burrow v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 88 N.C. App. 347, 363 S.E.2d 215, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910
(1988); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. rev denied,
317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986); Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617,
disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986); Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C.
App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39 (1985); Dockery v. Lampart
Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
54. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, dis rev. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
55. Id at 294, 244 S.E.2d at 274.
56. Id
57. Id at 295, 244 S.E.2d at 274.
58. Id
59. See id. at 296, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
60. Id. at 295-96, 244 S.E.2d at 274-75; see, eg., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
Contra Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Raley v. Darling Shop of Green-
vile, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950).
61. Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 296, 244 S.E.2d 272 275, disc rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
62. Id at 297, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
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and refused to limit the doctrine by recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge.6 3
In 1985 the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Sides v. Duke University"
altered the at-will employment doctrine by creating a narrow public policy ex-
ception. Plaintiff in Sides was a nurse anesthetist at defendant hospital.65 When
she accepted the position, the hospital informed her that it fired nurses only for
incompetence.6 6 After an operation, a staff physician ordered plaintiff to admin-
ister a certain anesthetic to a patient. 67 Plaintiff refused to do so fearing the
medication would cause complications for the patient. 68 The physician adminis-
tered the drug to the patient himself, and the patient suffered severe permanent
brain damage. 69 The injured patient's estate filed suit against the hospital and
the physician, alleging medical malpractice. 70 Sides was a deponent and trial
witness in the case. The hospital administrators attempted to persuade Sides to
"not tell all she had seen."'7 1 Sides refused to do so and testified truthfully at the
deposition and again at trial.72 The hospital administrators and physician lost
the case and the patient's estate won an award of $1,750,000. 73 Because of Sides'
refusal to perjure herself and her incriminating testimony against defendant, the
hospital discharged Sides. 74 She subsequently filed suit for wrongful discharge75,
basing her claim on a public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine.76
In deciding Sides, the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced the hurdle of
Dockery, the earlier case in which the court held that the cause of action of
retaliatory discharge did not exist in North Carolina. 77 The court distinguished
Dockery by pointing out that "the public policy considerations that affect this
case are much more compelling than those that affected" Dockery.78 The court
noted that the state legislature made perjury a felony under North Carolina law
and thus indicated that perjury is against the public policy of this state.79 In
63. Id. The General Assembly subsequently created a cause of action of retaliatory discharge,
prohibiting termination for filing a workers' compensation claim. Act of June 1, 1979, ch. 738, § 1,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 806 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985)).
64. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
Sides was analyzed in Note, Sides v. Duke Univ.: A Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-
Will Rule, 64 N.C.L. REv. 840 (1986).
65. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820.
66. Id. at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
75. Id. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820.
76. Id. at 335, 328 S.E.2d at 822.
77. Id. at 336, 328 S.E.2d at 822.
78. Id. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
79. Id. at 337-38, 328 S.E.2d at 823-24. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-209, 14-210 (1986) (peijury is
unlawful).
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support of its holding, the court cited Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,80 the seminal case creating the public policy exception in Califor-
nia.81 The North Carolina appellate court followed the reasoning of the Califor-
nia court and recognized the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. 82 The court
reasoned that if an employer can terminate employment for a refusal to act
unlawfully, employees may break the law for fear of losing their jobs if they
refuse.83 The purpose of the law is to prevent lawlessness; failing to recognize
this public policy exception would encourage lawlessness. 84 The Sides court
therefore established that discharge by the employer in retaliation for the em-
ployee's failure to commit perjury was an exception to the at-will employment
doctrine.85
In several cases after Sides the North Carolina Court of Appeals strictly
construed the Sides decision. In Walker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 6 plain-
tiff, a former employee of defendant,87 alleged that defendant fired him for rais-
ing safety concerns in the workplace.88 This court held that the facts did not fall
within the Sides exception. 89 Plaintiff did not indicate the interval of time be-
tween the reporting of the safety conditions and the plaintiff's discharge by de-
fendant.90 In contrast, plaintiff in Sides was "discharged within three months of
the protected conduct" 91 and suggested a causal relationship between these two
events. Plaintiff in Walker failed to forecast sufficient evidence that his dis-
charge was caused by his complaints about safety. 92 Furthermore, plaintiff did
not allege violations of federal or state safety regulations.93 The court stated that
even if a cause of action was recognized, plaintiff failed to allege sufficient evi-
80. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
81. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 339, 328 S.E.2d at 825. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959). The court emphasized the following language from Petermann: "'It would be obnoxious
to the interest of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to
discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a designated or unspecfied duration, on the
ground that the employee declined to commit pejury, an act specifically enjoined by statute.'" Id.
at 340, 328 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27).
82. Id. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27.
83. Id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826. The court stated:
Thus, while there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an
arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an
unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation
would enourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to dis-
courage and prevent.
Id. This language later was affirmed specifically by the supreme court in Coman, 325 N.C. at 175,
381 S.E.2d at 447; see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
84. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
85. Id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
86. 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39
(1986).
87. Id. at 254, 335 S.E.2d at 80.
88. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 85.
89. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 86.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 264, 335 S.E.2d at 86.
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dence to survive a motion for summary judgment.94 The court also feared that
creating a general cause of action would limit the at-will employment doctrine.9"
In Trought v. Richardson 96 the North Carolina Court of Appeals again re-
fused to extend the public policy exception beyond the facts of Sides.97 Plaintiff
in Trought was employed by defendant hospital in the position of Vice President
for Nursing Services. 98 Plaintiff transferred several licensed practical nurses
from the emergency room in order to comply with the Nursing Practice Act.99
Defendant allegedly discharged plaintiff because of these transfers,1 00 and plain-
tiff filed suit claiming wrongful discharge based on a violation of public pol-
icy. 101 The appellate court held that the facts of this case were not within the
Sides exception. 10 2 Sides created only a peijury exception to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine, and there was no allegation of perjury in this complaint.' 03
In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co. 104 three employees filed suit against
their employer claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination. 105 The chef of the coun-
try club allegedly harassed and verbally abused the employees.106 The trial court
did not recognize any of the wrongful termination suits because it construed the
Sides holding narrowly' 07 and declined to recognize a general public policy ex-
ception to the at-will employment doctrine. The court further interpreted Sides
as creating two exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine: discharge for re-
fusing to perform an illegal act and discharge for performing a legally required
act. 10 The court's interpretation here was dictum. In denying plaintiffs' wrong-
ful discharge claims, the court did not rely on this language. Furthermore, no
subsequent court has relied on this language defining the Sides exception.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 86.
96. 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617, disc rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986).
97. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 619.
98. Id. at 759, 338 S.E.2d at 618.
99. Id. at 759-60, 338 S.E.2d at 618. The North Carolina Nursing Practice Act appears at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-171.19 to -171.47 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
100. Trought, 78 N.C. App. at 760, 338 S.E.2d at 618.
101. Id. at 759-60, 338 S.E.2d at 618.
102. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 619.
103. Id.
104. 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986).
105. ML at 485, 340 S.E.2d at 118. The theory forming the basis for the wrongful termination
claim is unclear. The plaintiff may have made the theory underlying the claim vague deliberately in
order to survive a motion for summary judgment. This strategy failed. See id. at 499-500, 340
S.E.2d at 126.
106. Id. at 485, 340 S.E.2d at 118.
107. Id. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 125. This case was analyzed in Note, Hogan v. Forsyth Country
Club Co.: Workers' Compensation and Mental Injuries, 65 N.C.L. REv. 816 (1987).
108. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 126 (citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C.
71, 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1976)). The court stated, "We interpret Sides as recognizing a common
law claim for relief in tort in favor of an employee at will who is discharged from his employment in
retaliation for (1) his refusal to perform an act prohibited by law, or (2) his performance of an act
required by law. Otherwise, under the clear language of Smith v. Ford Motor Co., an employee at
will may be discharged with or without cause at anytime, unless his discharge is expressly prohib-
ited by statute." Id.
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In Guy v. Travenol Laboratories1°9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
also strictly construed the Sides exception. Plaintiff alleged that employees of
defendant laboratory falsified reports required by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration. 110 Plaintiff brought the violation to the attention of his superiors, and
they told him to falsify the reports.'11 Plaintiff refused and was discharged. 112
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was unwilling to expand the Sides
public policy exception and strictly construed North Carolina case law, pointing
out that the North Carolina courts adhered to the at-will employment doctrine
steadfastly.113 According to the federal appellate court, Sides created a "limited
perjury exception"'1 14 in order to "prevent perjury and preserve judicial integ-
rity."1 15 Under the facts of the Guy case, the court refused to recognize the
plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge. 116
In Burrow v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 117 defendant employed the plain-
tiff in the position of a truck driver. Plaintiff was injured on the job, and, unable
to drive safely, abandoned his truck on the highway.11 Plaintiff alleged that
defendant fired him in retaliation.1 19 In his suit for wrongful discharge, plaintiff
relied on the public policy exception articulated in Sides.120 The court held that
the overriding policy issues in Sides were not present in this case. 121 The court
stated that many jobs are dangerous or unsafe, and that it was not ready to
recognize a wrongful discharge claim under these facts.122
On appeal plaintiff raised the issue that the federal trucking regulation 123
prevented defendant from firing plaintiff.124 The court of appeals addressed the
issue and stated that the violation of the federal regulation did not create a cause
of action under North Carolina tort law.125
Courts interpreted Sides to create an exception to the at-will employment
doctrine only in situations in which an employer attempted to coerce an em-
109. 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1987).
110. Id at 912.
111. Id.
112. Id
113. Id. at 913. First, if the employee has obtained an employment contract of fixed duration,
then there is no employment-at-will. Id. Second, if the employee has provided some additional
consideration for the employment contract, such as changing his residence, then the employment is
no longer employment at will but rather it continues as long as performance is satisfactory. Id.
114. Id. at 915.
115. Id. at 914.
116. Id at 917.
117. 88 N.C. App. 347, 363 S.E.2d 215, dis. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910 (1988).
118. Id. at 348, 363 S.E.2d at 216.
119. Id.
120. Id at 353, 363 S.E.2d at 219.
121. Id. at 354, 363 S.E.2d at 219-20.
122. Id
123. Id., 363 S.E.2d at 220 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 392.3 (1986)). The regulation states that an
employee shall not drive when his physical condition is impaired. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The supreme court also addressed this issue in Coman and stated that its decsion was
not based on a violation of federal public policy, but rather was based on a violation of North
Carolina state public policy. Coman, 325 N.C. at 178, 381 S.E.2d at 449.
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ployee to commit perjury. In Williams v. Hillhaven Corp.,126 factually similar to
Sides, plaintiff was able to take advantage of the Sides exception. Plaintiff in
Williams was a registered nurse at defendant nursing home. 127 Plaintiff testified
under a subpoena at a hearing before the unemployment compensation commis-
sion regarding a claim made by a nursing assistant who was discharged by de-
fendant. 128 The commission awarded the nursing assistant unemployment
benefits. 129 After the hearing, defendant's manager became hostile towards
plaintiff and shortly thereafter fired plaintiff for minor infractions other employ-
ees were allowed to commit. 130 The court held that the facts of this case fell
within the narrow Sides exception prohibiting discharge for a refusal to commit
perjury. 13 1 The court emphasized that the North Carolina General Assembly
had recently passed a statute that created a cause of action identical to that
which plaintiff was claiming. 132 Even though the statute became effective after
plaintiff fied suit, the public policy articulated by the statute supported plain-
tiff's Claim. 133
In Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., the North Carolina Supreme
Court departed significantly from the at-will employment doctrine as it had been
followed for the past ninety years. The court affirmed the Sides public policy
exception13 4 and broadened it beyond the strict construction of the recent appel-
late decisions.
The Coman court affirmed specific language from the Sides opinion and
adopted this language as the North Carolina rule on public policy exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine:
[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no
reason, or for an arbitrary reason, there can be no right to terminate
such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes
public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction
lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and
prevent.135
Despite its careful reiteration of the Sides language, the court appeared to
limit the public policy exception to an employee's refusal to commit an unlawful
act. 13 6 Although perjury and a violation of federal and state trucking regulations
differ, "both offend the public policy of North Carolina." 137 Defendant in
Coman, by requiring plaintiff to drive longer than allowed by law, offended the
126. 91 N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988).
127. Id. at 36, 370 S.E.2d at 423.
128. Id. at 36, 370 S.E.2d at 424.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 37, 370 S.E.2d at 424.
131. Id. at 42, 370 S.E.2d at 426.
132. Id. at 41, 370 S.E.2d at 426 (citing Act of July 1, 1987, ch. 532, § 3, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws
863, 863-64 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-15.1 (1985))).
133. Id.
134. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
135. Id. (quoting Sides v. Duke Univ. Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc
rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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state's public policy objective of maintaining a safe public highway system as
evidenced by statutes and regulations. 138
The court did not state explicitly what are legitimate sources of public pol-
icy. At a minimum, the opinion identified statutes and administrative codes as
sources, 139 but the court left open the question whether sources such as ethical
codes or industry standards can be used to determine public policy. The Coman
court argued that it is the duty of the court to define public policy.'40 Further-
more, because courts created the at-will employment doctrine, the Coman court
argued that the courts rather than the legislature should interpret the rule. 141
The Coman court defined public policy broadly,142 stating that public policy is
"the principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good." 143 Beyond
these statements, the court gave little intimation as to the analysis it will apply in
deciding future public policy exception cases. Commentators have noted that a
lack of guidance on sources of public policy creates ambiguity in determining the
substance of public policy and therefore decreases the predictability of the
grounds for a wrongful discharge suit. 144
The effect of the Coman decision on the at-will employment doctrine will
depend on its interpretation by lower courts. A broad interpretation of the deci-
sion could lead to the negative economic consequences described by the dissent-
ing justice.145 In McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp.,146 an at-will
employment doctrine case decided after Coman, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals indicated it would interpret Coman narrowly. In that case, plaintiff
served as a manager of one of defendant's sales offices.147 During an evaluation
of an employee, the employee became abusive towards plaintiff.148 While de-
fending himself, plaintiff unintentionally struck the employee.149 Subsequently,
plaintiff manager was discharged. 150 The court found that the discharge was
not wrongful and refused to hold that the use of self-defense was a public policy
138. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-384 (1988) (allows the Department of Motor Vehicles to pro-
mulgate trucking regulations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-397 (1988) (reporting false information to the
Department of Motor Vehicles is a misdemeanor); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19A 3D.0801 (Sept.
1989) (United States Department of Transportation regulations apply in North Carolina).
139. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
140. Id., at 177 n.3, 381 S.E.2d at 448 n.3.
141. Id.
142. Id at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2.
143. Id (quoting Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959)).
144. A. HILL, supra note 46, at 27-28; W. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years
of Employer PNivilege, 21 IDAHO L. Rv. 201, 230-32 (1987).
145. Coman, 325 N.C. at 183-84, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissenting jus-
tice argued that the employers' legitimate concerns regarding a large increase in the number of
wrongful discharge suits were not dealt with by the majority. Id. In addition, this decision will
hinder recruitment of new industry by the state because the employer's ability to discharge employ-
ees is reduced. Id.
146. 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836 (1989).
147. Id at 302-03, 382 S.E.2d at 837.
148. Id at 303, 382 S.E.2d at 837-38.
149. Id, 382 S.E.2d at 838.
150. Id.
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exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 15 1
Writing for the McLaughlin court, Judge Becton stated that only two
cases-Sides and Coman-identified a public policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine.15 2 These cases had two key characteristics. 5 3 First, the em-
ployer affirmatively instructed the employee to violate the law. 154 Second, if the
employee acted according to the employer's instructions, "deleterious conse-
quences" for the public at large would result.'55 Judge Becton narrowly inter-
preted Coman as a moderate expansion of the Sides perjury exception. He
reasoned that Coman expanded the public policy exception to 'situations other
than those involving perjury or intimidation of witnesses, but did not expand the
exception to encompass broad definitions of public policy which occurred in
other jurisdictions.156 McLaughlin affirmed that the at-will employment doc-
trine is still in effect in North Carolina. 157
The Coman court did indicate some limitations on the availability of the
public policy exception as a theory to support a wrongful discharge cause of
action. The court emphasized the existence of statutes and regulations that sup-
ported the public policy of highway safety in North Carolina.' 5 8 Accordingly,
the court may have limited the public policy exception to those policies sup-
ported by statutes or regulations authorized by statute. In McLaughlin plaintiff
cited no statutes or regulations to support his contention that defendant em-
ployer's discharge violated public policy. This lack of statutory support may
have been a factor in not recognizing a public policy exception in McLaughlin.
151. Id. at 307, 382 S.E.2d at 840.
152. Id. at 306, 382 S.E.2d at 839-40.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id., 382 S.E.2d at 840.
156. Id. at 307, 382 S.E.2d at 840; see, eg., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (seminal case that first recognized perjury as a
public policy exception); Kerr v. Gibson's Products Co. of Bozeman, 226 Mont. 69, 73, 733 P.2d
1292, 1294-95 (1987) (finding firing without cause to be a breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and to constitute wrongful discharge). Several decisions by the Montana Supreme
Court led that state's legislature to pass the nation's first wrongful discharge statute. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1987) (§ 39-2-904 provides that discharge is wrongful when in retaliation
for employee's refusal to violate public policy; when not for good cause after the employee had
completed the employer's probationary period of employment; or when the employer violates ex-
press provisions of a written personnel policy); see LEONARD, A New Common Law of Employment
Termination, 66 N.C.L. REv. 631, 644 (1988).
157. McLaughlin v. Barclay's Am. Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 307, 382 S.E.2d 836, 840 (1989).
The court stated, "[W]e heed the Court's caution that the at-will doctrine remains in force in this
State." Id.
158. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447. Some North Carolina attorneys point out that
Coman-type actions have been filed in employment discrimination cases. Telephone interview with
Vicki Rowan, Associate with Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, in Charlotte, N.C. (Dec. 14,
1989). The North Carolina General Assembly has passed a statute that could potentially serve as a
basis for a Coman-type action. Id. The statute states in pertinent part:
It is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all
persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on
account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, or handicap by employers which
regularly employ 15 or more employees.
Equal Employment Practices Act, ch. 726, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Law 933 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-422.2 (1987)).
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Despite these arguments that may limit the effect of Coman, Coman
changed North Carolina law and lower courts today would likely decide some
earlier cases differently. In Trought v. Richardson,159 where defendant hospital
discharged plaintiff for her actions complying with the Nursing Practice Act,
plaintiff employee probably would have a valid cause of action of wrongful dis-
charge based on a public policy exception theory. The legislature enacted the
Nursing Practice Act to protect the health and safety of the public seeking medi-
cal care in the state's hospitals. 160 The Coman court expanded the public policy
exception beyond perjury to include violations of public policy that are injurious
to the public at large. Violation of federal and state trucking regulations and
statutes would put the safety of the travelling public at greater risk. Similarly,
violation of the Nursing Practice Act would put the health and safety of the
general public seeking medical care at greater risk. Given Coman, Trought's
wrongful discharge probably would survive the motion to dismiss today.
In Burrow v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 161 the same federal and state
trucking regulations used to support the public policy exception in Coman were
at issue.162 Coman recognized a wrongful discharge cause of action based on
protecting the public safety policy reflected in these trucking regulations. 163 It is
quite likely that a court today would find that plaintiff in Burrow had a cogniza-
ble wrongful discharge cause of action.
In addition to its expansion of the public policy exception, the Coman court
stated that bad faith conduct is not acceptable in commercial relationships. 164
By this statement, the court may have forecast future cognizable theories sup-
porting wrongful discharge suits. This dictum implies that bad faith on the part
of the employer or a violation of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing would support a wrongful discharge cause of action.
The Coman court distinguished the public policy exception from an excep-
tion for bad faith,1 65 implying that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
a provision of every employment contract. 166 This recognition of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing appears to be a new development in labor
law in North Carolina. 167 The effect of this development will depend on the
159. 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986); see
supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
160. Nursing Practice Act, ch. 360, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 397 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-171.19 (1985) (act was "necessary to ensure minimum standards of competency and to provide
the public safe nursing care")).
161. 88 N.C. App. 347, 363 S.E.2d 215, disc rev. denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910 (1988);
see supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
162. Id. at 354, 363 S.E.2d at 220. On appeal the plaintiff in Burrow cited 49 C.F.R. § 392.3
(1986) and 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (Supp. V 1987). Burrow, 88 N.C. App. at 354, 363 S.E.2d at 220.
163. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447. The plaintiffin Coman cited 49 C.F.R, §§ 390-
398, which are applicable in North Carolina through N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19A 3D.0801 (Sept.
1989). See supra note 138.
164. Coman, 325 N.C. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448. The Coman court stated, "Bad faith conduct
should not be tolerated in employment relations, just as it is not accepted in other commercial rela-
tionships." Id.
165. Id. at 176-77, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
166. Id. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
167. Id.
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interpretation of bad faith by lower courts.
Bad faith, like public policy, is an inherently ambiguous term. In its discus-
sion of the bad faith exception, the court in Coman cited favorably cases from
other jurisdictions that broadly interpreted the implied covenant. 168 These cases
gave the employees greater legal protection from discharge than under the at-
will employment doctrine. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., for example, the
California Court of Appeals found that the implied covenant of good faith cre-
ated a "good cause" standard of discharge. 169 The good cause standard places a
heavy burden on employers and requires employers to justify reasons for the
discharge.
The Coman court's citation of cases from other jurisdictions that broadly
interpret bad faith and the implied covenant of good faith may indicate that the
North Carolina court will eventually adopt a good cause standard for discharge
in future cases. Courts in other jurisdictions have considered many factors in
determining bad faith. These factors include the employee's length of service,170
provisions in an employment manual regarding dismissal, 171 company proce-
dures regarding dismissal, 172 and the employer's retaliatory intent in dismissing
the employee. 7 3 The courts have provided little guidance in the relevant weight
of these factors.174 Without more guidance regarding the interpretation of bad
faith or the implied covenant of good faith, the employer's liability for dismissal
of an employee is unpredictable.
In addition to creating ambiguities regarding what public policy is sufficient
to support an exception to the at-will employment doctrine or when bad faith
will support a wrongful discharge action, the Coman court failed to clarify the
types of damages recoverable in a wrongful discharge suit. Because it was ruling
on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court did not have to address the issue of
damages. Some jurisdictions that recognize wrongful discharge based on the
public policy exception allow the recovery of both contract and tort damages. 175
168. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (created
"good cause" standard for discharge); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (bad faith supports wrongful discharge claim); Kerr v. Gibson's Products Co.,
226 Mont. 69, 733 P.2d 1292 (1987) (wrongful discharge based on violation of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (bad
faith exception and public policy exception recognized).
169. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
170. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
171. Kerr, 226 Mont. at 72, 733 P.2d at 1294.
172. Id.; see also Cleary, I1l Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
173. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974). This decision
was later limited to discharges for an employee's refusal to commit an act public policy condemns or
for performance of an act public policy encourages. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295,
297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980).
174. Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 S.2d at 551. The court stated, "[i]n all employment contracts,
whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit
must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the pub-
lic's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two." Id.
175. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 666-67, 765 P.2d 373, 377 (1988). The
California Supreme Court held that tort damages are recoverable in wrongful discharge actions
based on the public policy exception. Id; see also Payne & Smith, Establishing the Boundaries of
Wrongful Discharge: California's Foley Decision, 15 EMP. REL. L.J. 35, 39 (1989); Tompkins, Legis-
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Courts generally only allow recovery of contract damages under a theory of
violation of the implied covenant of good faith. The cases cited in Coman follow
this general rule regarding damages. 176 In Cleary, however, the California appel-
late court allowed recovery for both contract and tort damages. 177 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court in December, 1988, limited recovery in implied covenant
cases to contract damages only and stated that the Cleary court erred in al-
lowing the recovery of tort damages.178 The types of damages recoverable
should be clarified in future decisions.
The Coman exception leaves open additional questions to be considered in
future cases. For instance, what effect might a mistake by the employer or em-
ployee have on a wrongful discharge claim? What should be the resolution of
the problem of an employee who thought the employer's order was unlawful
when in fact it was lawful or of an employer who thought the act was lawful
when in fact it was unlawful? 179 These questions of mistake should be resolved
in a future decision with appropriate facts.
Coman significantly limited the at-will employment doctrine in North Car-
olina by creating a public policy exception. The language regarding bad faith
was not necessary to the court's holding and may be weakened in future cases.
Additionally, the Coman court left to future decisions the task of defining public
policy and bad faith. A broad interpretation could significantly disrupt an em-
ployer's ability to run his business. 180 A more clearly defined limitation could go
a long way in advancing specific public policy goals set by the General Assem-
bly. The court in Coman set a broad standard. The broad language of this
decision heralds more wrongful discharge suits based on a broader range of theo-
ries than in the past.
DUNCAN ALFORD
lating the Employment Relationships: Montana's Wrongful Discharge Law, 14 EMP. REL. L.J. 387,
390 (1989).
176. In Monge the New Hampshire court allowed recovery for contract damages only, and spe-
cifically excluded any damages for mental distress. Monge, 114 N.H. at 134, 316 S.2d at 552. In
Fortune the Massachusetts Supreme Court allowed recovery only for contract damages. Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 103, 364 N.E.2d 1251 1256 (1977).
177. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 730
(1980).
178. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 687, 765 P.2d at 392. The Foley court noted that few jurisdictions
allowed recovery of tort damages for breach of an implied covenant ofgood faith. Id. at 686-87 n.26,
765 P.2d at 391 n.26. The dissenting justice in Coman emphasized that California had retreated
from its development of wrongful discharge. Coman, 325 N.C. at 185-86, 381 S.E.2d at 453 (Meyer,
J. dissenting).
179. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the La-
bor Law Issue of the 80"s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 7-8 (Nov. 1984).
180. The costs of defending an unfounded wrongful discharge suit even at the motion to dismiss
stage can be burdensome for the employer. Furthermore, the threat of suits will encourage employ-
ers to document every action taken regarding an employee's career which will further increase the
cost of doing business.
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